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ABSTRACT
In a recent, high-profile ruling, a federal court finally
recognized that a substantial delay in executing a death row inmate
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. Courts have repeatedly rejected these so-called
“Lackey claims,” making the federal court’s decision in Jones v.
Chappell all the more important. And yet it was deeply flawed.
This paper focuses on one of the major flaws in the Jones decision
that largely escaped attention: the application of the nonretroactivity rule from Teague v. Lane. By comprehensively
addressing the merits of the Teague bar as applied to Lackey claims,
and making the case for applying the bar, this paper adds to, and
challenges, the existing literature on capital punishment, Lackey
claims, and Teague doctrine. This paper dissects the Jones ruling
on the application of Teague, examining the Supreme Court’s “new
rule” case law and concluding that Lackey claims, when viewed at
the appropriate level of generality, propose a new rule. It then
addresses the more complicated aspect of applying Teague in this
context, recognizing that the first Teague exception poses the most
likely basis for avoiding the Teague bar on a Lackey claim. At a
minimum, Lackey claims (like Miller v. Alabama claims, now the
subject of substantial Eighth Amendment litigation on collateral
review) sit at the intersection of procedural and substantive rules.
Nonetheless, this paper makes the case for viewing the claim as
procedural and therefore Teague-barred. Ultimately, then, this
paper emphasizes a point that could substantially influence existing
litigation: litigators and federal judges should take the Teague bar
more seriously when considering Lackey claims on federal habeas
review, particularly when viewed in light of modern habeas rules
961
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and doctrine that limit relief and protect the interests of the states.
But the paper also emphasizes an important point about death
penalty policy and politics: if the state is to have a death penalty at
all, it should be prepared, and willing, to ensure that death
sentences are actually carried out.

I. INTRODUCTION
The use of courts to attack the legality – and often the political
wisdom or desirability – of capital punishment is hardly novel.
Although capital punishment opponents have never been able to
secure a majority of votes on the Supreme Court for the proposition
that the death penalty is itself and in all circumstances
unconstitutional, they have been able to use litigation to
substantially narrow the death penalty’s availability and to shape
the procedures available in capital cases. 1 Yet, courts give and
courts take away – or to be more accurate, sometimes they reject
completely. One claim, though popular in the academic literature
on capital punishment,2 has consistently fallen upon deaf judicial
ears: that the death penalty is unconstitutional where the state fails
to carry out the execution quickly enough.3 Not unlike other claims
1 See J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital Punishment, 56
FLA. L. REV. 639 (2006).
2 Unsurprisingly, the academic literature has been, for some time, far more
friendly to the claim. See, e.g., Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps
Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1998) (discussing the procedural complications of the
claim); Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
147 (1998) (discussing whether the claim is enough for cruel and unusual
punishment); Kathleen M. Flynn, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted
Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to An Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291 (1997) (arguing that the
claim is enough to violate the Eighth Amendment); Ryan S. Hedges, Justice
Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s Refusal to Hear A Claim for Inordinate Delay
of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
577 (2001) (arguing for the right to be heard and have case decided on the
merits); Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the
Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281 (2001-02) (discussing the
questions surrounding delays in capital punishment); Erin Simmons,
Challenging An Execution After Prolonged Confinement on Death Row [Lackey
Revisited], 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1249, 1264 (2009) (noting barriers to
making the claim); Kara Sharkey, Delay in Considering the Constitutionality of
Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth Amendment, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 861 (2013) (addressing the Lackey claim).
3 See Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
Lackey claim); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F. 3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying
claim); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (denying relief);
Fearance v. Scott, 56 F. 3d 633, 636-40 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Parker v. State,
873 So.2d 270, 294 (Fla. 2004) (concluding the lower court did not abuse its
discretion and thus denying the defendant’s request); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d
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that have failed over and over again, however, this strange claim
has recently found a friend not just in the abolition-friendly confines
of academia or the capital defense bar, but also in the federal
judiciary.
It is not unfair to describe the claim as “strange,” at least in
some sense of the term. After all, the execution-delay claim is raised
by the very inmates and capital defense lawyers who deliberately
engage in litigation that produces delays in carrying out
executions.4 This is not to say that such litigation should be
forbidden; it should not. The criminal justice system and the wellbeing of the political community are better served by a process that
allows for rigorous, if carefully circumscribed, review of capital
convictions and sentences. But however legitimate or wellintentioned, extensive capital litigation quite obviously delays
executions. Surely, inmates and their lawyers will file their legal
challenges to conviction and sentence with the expectation that the
litigation will to some degree prolong the inmate’s life. So it seems
indeed bizarre that an inmate filing the claims designed to protect
and prolong his life would simultaneously claim that the state is
acting unlawfully by not killing him sooner. 5 How, one might
imagine, would death row inmates and opponents of capital
punishment react if the State affirmatively took steps to accelerate
post-conviction review and pending executions? 6 How, moreover,
29, 45 (Cal. 1998) (deciding it was not cruel and unusual punishment to execute
a defendant after 16 years of imprisonment).
4 See, e.g., Fearance, 56 F.3d at 639 (“What [the record] shows is that
Fearance was not the unwilling victim of a Bleak House-like procedural system
hopelessly bogged down; at every turn, he, without complaining about the
accumulating period on death row, sought extensions of time, hearings, and
reconsiderations.”).
5 See Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the denial of certiorari) (“I remain ‘unaware of any support in American
constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a
defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.’”) (quoting Knight
v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas J., concurring in denial of certiorari);
Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying Lackey claim because
delays were attributable to defendant’s own conduct). But see Russell L.
Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively Delayed
Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2015) (arguing against the prisoner fault
rationale for rejecting delay-in-execution claims).
6 Note, for example, that 28 U.S.C. § 2261 et seq. provides for expedited
federal habeas review for jurisdictions that satisfy the fast-track “opt-in”
criteria. This provision has never had much effect, in part because of questions
about which jurisdictions satisfy the criteria and in part because of protracted
efforts by the Department of Justice to issue implementing regulations. Still,
some groups advocating greater legal protections for death row inmates have
said that the provisions should be repealed, and have also argued that the
statute of limitations for federal habeas review be either repealed or extended,
and the other procedural limits on federal habeas review be repealed. See, e.g.,
SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND
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would this unusual argument – made, and rejected, time and again
– ultimately prevail in court?
A federal court in California recently gave us an example. In
Jones v. Chappell, the district court ruled that California violated
the federal Constitution by maintaining a system in which inmates
languished on death row for inordinately long periods of time
without being executed.7 According to the court in Jones, the delays
in California were attributable not primarily to inmates seeking
relief but to the State’s “dysfunctional post-conviction review
process,” where litigation takes too long to resolve and where there
is little chance that a death row inmate will ever actually be
executed.8 Such a system violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishments, the court said, because it results
in arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty and serves no
legitimate penological goal.9
The Jones holding attracted
substantial media attention and commentary, 10 and has already
found its way into legal scholarship on the death penalty. 11
Though it has never ruled on the merits of this kind of claim,
the Supreme Court has consistently declined to even hear one on its
certiorari review. The most notable rejection came in Lackey v.
Texas12 (thus producing the “Lackey claim”). And yet in that case,
Justices Stevens and Breyer, in a memorandum respecting the
denial of certiorari, signaled that they would be willing to entertain
the argument on its merits.13 Those same justices later articulated
the same rationale in subsequent cases. 14 But the Court has never
CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE SMART ON CRIME COALITION 195-97 (2010) (making
these recommendations). Notably, the groups that contributed to this section
of the full “Smart on Crime” Report include the American Bar Association,
Amnesty International, The Constitution Project, and the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund – none of these groups would be generally regarded as friendly
toward capital punishment.
7 See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp.3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
8 Id. at 1062.
9 Id. at 1063-1069.
10 See, e.g., Edvard Petterson & Alison Vekshin, California’s Death Penalty
System
Ruled
Unconstitutional,
Bloomberg.com,
available
at
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-16/california-death-penalty-system-ruledunconstitutional.html (posted July 17, 2014).
11 See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital
Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 999 (2014)
(discussing Jones); Sam Kamin & Justin F. Marceau, Waking the Furman
Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 983 (2015) (same); Christopher, supra note 5,
at 11 (same); Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed is Retribution Denied, 99
MINN. L. REV. 421, 444 (2014) (citing Jones); James Gibson & Corinna Lain,
Death Penalty Drugs and the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J.
1215, 1270 (2015) (noting Jones and explaining how the international
marketplace has had an effect on the ability of states to carry out executions by
making lethal injection drugs unavailable).
12 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
13 See id. (Stevens & Breyer, JJ, respecting denial of certiorari).
14 See, e.g., Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
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subscribed to those minority views. The Lackey claim, then, has
consistently failed, at the Supreme Court and in the lower courts. 15
Until now, thanks to Jones. The Supreme Court even recently
granted a stay of execution to Texas death row inmate Lester
Bower,16 who raised in his certiorari petition – and citing Jones – a
claim that his wait on death row for over thirty years violated the
Eighth Amendment.17 Although the Court’s order granting the stay
did not state its reasons for doing so, it is not hard to imagine that
some Justices may have afforded the delay-in-execution claim some
weight, in addition to the other claims that Bower raised. Bower’s
petition was eventually denied,18 but signaled that references to
Jones, and to delays in execution more generally, are likely to
continue to crop up in capital litigation before the Court, and in the
lower courts. This is particularly true as the average time between
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 111421 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari & Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-99
(1999) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). One commentator (Lackey’s
former lawyer, in fact) has suggested that Justice Kennedy might be prepared
to join Justices Stevens and Breyer. Newton, supra note 11, at 999.
15 See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558
U.S. 1067 (2009) (holding the Lackey claim should not “accrue until an execution
date is set”); Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1114; Foster, 537 U.S. at 990. See also
supra n.3 (citing lower court cases rejecting Lackey claims).
16 See Bower v. Texas, No. 14-292 (U.S., Feb. 5, 2015) (granting order for
stay of execution).
17 Pet. For Cert., Bower v. Texas, No. 14-292, at i, 31 (U.S., filed Sept. 9,
2014). Two points about Bower’s claim are noteworthy here. First, the
procedural posture of his case differed somewhat from that in Jones and other
cases involving Lackey claims raised on collateral review – Bower was appealing
the denial of a state habeas petition in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; he
is not raising the claim on appeal from denial of federal habeas review. Id. at
10. Second, as Texas’s brief in opposition rightly pointed out: “Texas is not
California.” Respondent’s Brief in Opp., Bower v. Texas, No. 14-292, at 35 (U.S.,
filed Nov. 13, 2014). With respect to the willingness of the State to carry out
executions, that is quite correct and an obvious ground for distinguishing Jones.
Of course, Bower also raised a Penry claim and a Brady claim in his petition,
see Pet. for Cert., supra this note, at i, and it is certainly possibly that one of
those claims warranted further consideration by the Court. It may also be
significant that Bower has consistently maintained his innocence, though this
would hardly make him unique among death row inmates. Bower was convicted
and sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of four men at an airplane hangar.
See Mark Berman, Supreme Court stays execution of Texas inmate on death row
for 30 years, WashingtonPost.com, www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/02/05/supreme-court-stays-execution-of-texas-inmate-ondeath-row-for-30-years (posted Feb. 5, 2015) (discussing the inmate’s stay of
execution).
18 See Bower v. Texas, 135 S. Ct. 1291 (2015) (noting that Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, would have granted the petition,
and focused upon the Penry claim in their dissent from the denial of certiorari).
The dissent did not mention Jones or the delay-in-execution claim more
generally.
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sentencing and execution widens, if the execution ever occurs at
all.19 So there is every reason to believe, particularly after Jones,
that these claims will arise with some frequency in future capital
habeas cases, perhaps with more frequency than in years past.
A mountain of sound reasons exist to reject Lackey claims on
the merits and to conclude that Jones was wrong. The opinion
seems to misunderstand retribution,20 for example, and it utterly
fails to give any precise guidance as to how long of a stay on death
row is too long for the Eighth Amendment to tolerate. Moreover,
had the district court found that the petition was subject to the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the claim
could easily have been rejected using the deference provisions of
that law, which permit federal habeas relief only where a state court
judgment on the merits was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established law. 21 These concerns are the tip
of the iceberg, and others have more carefully articulated the lack
of merit in the Jones opinion.22 The one ground for disposing of the
issue, however, that largely escaped attention in the wake of the
Jones ruling is based on the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in
Teague v. Lane.23 Indeed, in the Fifth Circuit litigation of Clarence
Allen Lackey’s delay-in-execution claim, it was Teague that
principally served as the barrier to habeas relief. 24 Other courts
19 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the average elapsed time
between sentence and execution is 186 months (about fifteen-and-a-half years).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2013 – STATISTICAL TABLES, at 14
(Dec. 2014). According to news reports, for example, the average time on death
row in Arizona is 23 years, see Cooper Rummel, The real cost of the death
penalty in Arizona, KTAR.com, available at http://ktar.com/22/1770745/Thereal-cost-of-the-death-penalty-in-Arizona (posted Sept. 30, 2014); and the
average time between sentence and execution in Florida is a little over sixteen
years, see A Look at Florida’s Death Row, NBCMiami.com, available at
www.nbcmiami.com/news/A-Look-at-Floridas-Death-Row-245208951.html
(posted Feb. 12, 2014).
See also R.G., Why so many death row inmates in America will die of old age,
The Economist explains blog, http:www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2014/02/economist-explains-0 (posted Feb. 3, 2014) (discussing delays
in execution).
20 Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1064-65.
21 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court found that AEDPA did not
apply because the state court never reached the merits of Jones’s Eighth
Amendment delay-in-execution claim. Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1068 n.23.
22 See Kent Scheidegger, Why Jones v. Chappell is Wrong, Part 2, Crime
and Consequences Blog (posted July 21, 2014) www.crimeandconsequences.com
/crimblog/2014/07/why-jones-v-chappell-is-wrong-.html (giving reasons why
Jones was wrong); Kent Scheidegger, The Lackey Claim, Again, Crime and
Consequences Blog (posted July 16, 2014) (noting delays are the problem).
Notably, one court has already refused to follow Jones. See generally Hulett v.
State, 766 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2014).
23 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
24 See Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating the stay of
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have followed suit.25 The Teague doctrine, ever complicated but now
well-developed over twenty-five years, states that new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure – those that were not dictated by
precedent when the conviction became final – are barred from
recognition on federal post-conviction collateral review.26 This
general law of non-retroactivity for new rules has two notable
exceptions: when the new rule is substantive, rather than
procedural;27 or when the new rule is a watershed rule of procedure
that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and essential to
ensuring the fairness and accuracy of trial and punishment. 28
Teague developed at a time when the Court was engaged in
the process of narrowing the ability of inmates to use federal habeas
corpus litigation as a means for benefitting from the explication of
new constitutional norms. 29 Federal habeas petitioners should not
have the benefit of those new norms in federal court, Teague held,
when previous decisions faithfully applied the law that existed at
the time of conviction, sentence, and finality. 30 Along with
exhaustion and procedural default doctrines, 31 as well as the more
government-friendly standard for harmless error review on
habeas,32 Teague fit nicely into a habeas doctrine that was now
emphasizing important differences between direct review and
federal habeas review. Habeas doctrine, by the 1980s, was also now
giving greater primacy to state court adjudication on collateral
review of state convictions and sentences. 33 In so doing, it
emphasized the roles of the state courts in the federal system and
the limits of federal jurisdiction when reviewing the decisions of a
execution).
25 Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting Lackey
claim on Teague grounds); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the Lackey claim also on Teague grounds).
26 Teague, 489 U.S. at 299-301.
27 Id. at 311.
28 Id.
29 See Patrick Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433,
2437-38 (1993) (discussing the different approaches). For reference to the
extensive criticism of Teague in the academic literature, see Tung Yin, A Better
Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane
and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 203, 206 n. 11 (2008) (citing the literature as of the mid-1990s).
30 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10.
31 See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel could be procedurally defaulted); Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991) (discussing procedural default doctrine); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (discussing doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977) (same).
32 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (holding the standard is
whether error had substantial and injurious effect of influence in determining
jury’s verdict).
33 See J. Richard Broughton, Habeas Corpus and the Safeguards of
Federalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 134-35 (2004) (discussing cases with
similar reasoning that federalism justified limits).
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sovereign entity responsible for the definition, enforcement, and
administration of its own criminal laws. 34
In its Teague
jurisprudence in particular, the Court connected the purposes of the
writ to the protection of good-faith (even if incorrect) action on the
part of state courts. “Foremost among” these purposes, the Court
said, “is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in
accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of those
proceedings.”35 This means that the habeas court “need only apply
the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place.”36 Congress took that emphasis a step
further when it adopted the deference provisions of the AEDPA,
which arguably codified Teague.37 Still, Teague stands independent
of AEDPA and its strictures differ slightly from those under the
habeas statute. It applies even in cases that are not governed by
AEDPA (like, arguably, Jones).38 Teague, then, is another of the
modern habeas rules that promote comity, finality, and federalism
during federal adjudication of a state prisoner’s claims. 39 Unlike
AEDPA’s legislative mandate, though, Teague and its sister
doctrines are judicially-enforced constraints on federal court power.
And they formed an important, if less-noticed, part of the Rehnquist
Court’s larger effort to revive judicially-enforced federalism.40
As it relates to Teague, the Jones opinion is notable in two
ways. First, California did not raise the Teague bar as a defense.41
34 Id. at 116. See also Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal
Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337, 1344-45 (2002) (describing the Teague
doctrine as “utterly devastating to the Warren Court’s federal vision of criminal
procedure.”). Cf. Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797
(1992) (explaining that Teague was less about retroactivity rules and really
about “curtailing” habeas relief).
35 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
36 Teague, 489 U.S. at 306.
37 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
38 In Jones, the court found that AEDPA deference did not apply because
the state court never adjudicated Jones’s Lackey claim in the merits. See Jones,
31 F. Supp.3d at 1068 n. 23.
39 See Broughton, supra note 33, at 135-54 (discussing the modern trend).
But see Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1991) (criticizing Teague
as too narrow and stringent); James S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro”:
The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U.
J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537 (1990-91) (arguing that Teague would do damage to
the ability of prisoners to obtain the writ).
40 Broughton, supra note 33, at 160-62.
41 Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1068. California has now appealed the judgment
in Jones to the Ninth Circuit, and has asserted the Teague bar in its briefing.
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Jones v. Davis, No. 14-56373 at 33-37 (9th Cir.
filed Dec. 1, 2014). The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation has filed an amicus
brief siding with California, and has also raised Teague in its briefing. See Brief
of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
and Supporting Reversal (hereinafter “CJLF Brief”); Jones v. Davis, No. 1456373 at 13-16 (9th Cir. filed Dec. 9, 2014). Both of these briefs rely on many of
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The district court therefore did not have the benefit of reasoned
briefing and argument from the State that would have explained
how Teague operated to bar Jones’s Lackey claim. And second, the
State’s failure notwithstanding, Judge Carney addressed the
Teague problem sua sponte and, in a single paragraph, found that
Teague did not apply.42 The rule that Jones sought, according to the
court, was “that the state may not arbitrarily inflict the death
penalty” and that rule “is not new. Rather, it is inherent in the most
basic notions of due process and fair punishment embedded in the
core of the Eighth Amendment.”43 The opinion cites the concurring
opinions of Justices Brennan and Douglas in Furman v. Georgia for
that proposition,44 then states that the rule is “‘so deeply embedded
in the fabric of due process that everyone takes it for granted.’” 45
This article challenges the Teague-based conclusion in Jones
and offers an argument – the one that California could have made
(and should also have made in its appellate briefing) and that states
defending themselves against execution delay claims in future cases
should make – for why Lackey claims are Teague-barred. In doing
so, this article seeks to offer a deeper and more nuanced assessment
of Teague in the Lackey context than the few existing cases do. The
article first contends that, contrary to the Jones opinion, an inmate
raising a Lackey claim is asking for a new rule. Next, because the
claim would not fit the Court’s understanding of a watershed rule,
the article grapples with the more complicated problem of whether
the rule is procedural or substantive, and offers a plausible
argument for why the rule is procedural. At a minimum, this article
concludes, federal courts hearing Lackey claims should take the
Teague bar seriously, and afford Teague doctrine more careful
consideration than it was given in the early Jones litigation. The
article also demonstrates why Eighth Amendment claims can be
subject to the Teague bar, and are not subject to wholesale
exemption from Teague’s general rule of non-retroactivity.

II. LACKEY CLAIMS AS NEW RULES
The threshold consideration in determining whether Teague
applies to a delay-in-execution claim is whether the petitioner is
seeking the benefit of a “new rule.” The core sentiment expressed
in the Jones opinion is that delay-in-execution claims do not propose
new rules.46 This is wrong.
According to Judge Carney’s opinion, the Lackey claim is
the same cases and doctrine to which I refer in this Article.
42 Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1068-69.
43 Id. at 1068.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1069.
46 Id. at 1068.
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based on the application of a well-established principle from
Furman v. Georgia, that the death penalty cannot be imposed
arbitrarily and must serve legitimate penological goals. 47 Teague is
no bar where the petitioner seeks to have a settled precedent simply
apply to a new set of facts, but does nothing more and imposes no
additional obligations on the government. 48
Therefore, the
argument runs, the rule upon which a Lackey claimant relies is
simply a logical extension of settled Eighth Amendment principle.
But this is not, and cannot be, correct. At least, it cannot be
correct based upon the Supreme Court’s extensive “new rule”
jurisprudence. This kind of analysis – which, it is important to note,
also ignores Ninth Circuit precedent finding that a Lackey claim
proposes a new rule,49 precedent that should have bound the district
court in Jones – fails to properly apply the standard for “new rules”
and exists at a level of generality that is too high to enable the
Teague doctrine to function effectively.
The Court has kept the definition of a “new rule” broad, and
the key to the analysis is whether the rule was dictated by precedent
at the time the conviction became final. In Butler v. McKellar, the
Court stated that a rule is new if it “breaks new ground or imposes
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”50 This
standard helps to validate “reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts even though they are
shown to be contrary to later decisions.”51 A rule does not avoid the
non-retroactivity bar merely because it is “within the logical
compass of” or even “controlled by” a prior decision. 52 Rather, upon
surveying the legal landscape as it existed when the conviction
became final,53 if reasonable judicial minds could debate whether
the rule was mandated by precedent, then it is by definition “new.” 54
The Court has said that Teague “serves to ensure that gradual
developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree
are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions when
entered.”55 If the conviction and sentence complied with existing
federal law at the time of finality, then, the emergence of a new
doctrine should not be used to permit continued reexamination of
the state’s judgment. Teague, the Court has said, “asks state court
judges to act reasonably, not presciently.” 56 If the unlawfulness of
the conviction would not be “apparent to all reasonable jurists” –
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 1068-69.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307.
See Smith, 611 F.3d at 998-99 (rejecting the new rule).
494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 468 (1993).
O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 160 (1997).
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 166.
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that is, if there is any other reasonable interpretation – then the
rule is new and can only be applied retroactively if it meets one of
the two exceptions.57
Consequently, arguments like the one that the court makes in
Jones – that the rule articulated there is based on the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on arbitrary death penalties, per Furman
– exist at a level of abstraction that is too high to satisfy Teague.
Indeed, if the new rule standard was meant to be understood at such
a level of generality, one would be hard-pressed to imagine how the
Court’s “new rule” jurisprudence would have developed as it has.
Unsurprisingly, the Court has rejected similar efforts.
As Kent Scheidegger has properly explained, the Court has
confronted the level-of-generality problem in the Teague context
and has favored specificity rather than appeals to general Eighth
Amendment (or other constitutional) principles. 58 Scheidegger
helpfully cites Sawyer v. Smith,59 which posed the question of
whether the Court’s holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi – which
prohibits prosecutors from arguing to the sentencing jury that
responsibility for the defendant’s sentence lies with others60 – was
a “new rule.” In describing the case, the brutality of Sawyer’s
actions should not be overlooked. Sawyer and an accomplice beat
Frances Arwood, dragged her naked body into a bathroom, kicked
her into the bathtub, and scalded her with hot water. 61 Sawyer then
kicked her in the chest and caused her head to strike something in
the bathroom, which left her unconscious. 62 After beating her more,
Sawyer doused her body (including her genital area) with lighter
fluid and set her on fire.63 Sawyer argued that the Louisiana
prosecutor in his case violated Caldwell, which was decided a year
after Sawyer’s conviction became final, when the prosecutor
informed the jury that other decision-makers in the system would
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528, 539 (1997).
See Kent Scheidegger, Why Jones v. Chappell is Wrong, Part 3 – Teague
v. Lane, posting at Crime and Consequences Blog, available at
www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2014/07/why-jones-v-chappell-iswrong.html (posted July 22, 2014) (discussing the level-of-generality problem).
See also CJLF Brief, supra note 41, at 14 (arguing that the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected efforts to avoid the “new rule” standard by merely invoking
broad constitutional principles).
59 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
60 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
61 Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 229-30.
62 Id. at 230.
63 Id. An even fuller account of the events is contained in the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s original decision on direct review, affirming the conviction and
sentence. See generally State v. Sawyer, 422 So.2d 95 (La. 1982), vacated by
Sawyer v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983). The state supreme court’s opinion
referred to the conduct of Sawyer and his accomplice as “bizarre,” “frightful,”
and ”sadistic.” Id. at 97-98. In its opinion on remand, the court described the
facts as “gruesome and depraved.” Sawyer v. State, 442 So.2d 1136 (La. 1983).
57
58
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review the jury’s decision. 64 To establish that Caldwell was not a
new rule, Sawyer argued that Caldwell fit within the scope of prior
Eighth Amendment cases that generally require reliability in the
capital sentencing decision.65 The Court rejected this kind of
argument by requiring a more specific level of abstraction in order
to establish his claim. “In petitioner’s view, Caldwell was dictated
by the principle of reliability in capital sentencing. But the test
would be meaningless if applied at this level of generality.”66 The
Court had never decided, prior to Caldwell, that a prosecutor’s
argument to a capital sentencing jury violated the Eighth
Amendment.67 Consequently, a state court reviewing Sawyer’s
claim at the time would not have felt compelled to find the
prosecutor’s argument constitutionally problematic under the
Eighth Amendment.68 Scheidegger is therefore correct in asserting
that Sawyer fundamentally undermines Judge Carney’s effort to
ground the Lackey claim in a highly abstract version of Eighth
Amendment rights.
Other examples in the Court’s Teague jurisprudence lend
further support to this point, which is fatal to Judge Carney’s
Teague analysis. In O’Dell v. Netherland, a federal habeas
petitioner – who had been convicted of capital murder, rape, and
sodomy in Virginia, after physically and sexually assaulting a
woman and strangling her “with such violence that bones in her
neck were broken and finger imprints were left on her skin” 69 –
argued that he was entitled to relief under a line of Supreme Court
decisions that culminated in Simmons v. South Carolina.70 That
case, decided in 1994, held that a capital defendant may inform the
sentencing jury that he is not parole-eligible under existing state
law, where the prosecution introduces evidence of the defendant’s
future dangerousness.71 Eight years earlier, in Skipper v. South
Carolina, the Court held that, where the prosecutor had argued that
the defendant would pose disciplinary problems in prison and would
likely rape other prisoners, the defendant was entitled under the
Eighth Amendment to have the jury consider evidence that he
would not be a danger to others if incarcerated. 72 Still nine years
earlier, in Gardner v. Florida, a plurality of the Court held that it
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 235-36.
66 Id. at 236 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (concerning
qualified immunity standard “[i]f the test of ‘clearly established law’ were to be
applied at this level of generality, [p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule
of qualified immunity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply be
alleging violation of extremely abstract rights”)).
67 Id. at 236.
68 Id. at 237.
69 521 U.S. 151, 153 (1997).
70 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
71 Id.
72 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
64
65
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was unconstitutional to impose the death sentence on the basis of
information that the defendant had no opportunity to deny or
explain (there, the judge imposed the death sentence based on a
presentence report that was not available to Gardner).73 O’Dell,
who also was denied an opportunity to introduce evidence of his
parole ineligibility and whose conviction became final in 1988,
argued that Simmons applied retroactively to his case because it
was “merely a variation of the facts of Skipper,”74 which in turn
relied upon Gardner, and thus was not a new rule.75
The Supreme Court disagreed. Simmons, it turns out, was a
problematic case for finding a legal mandate because it was merely
a plurality opinion and the separate opinions articulated views
ranging from Justice Blackmun’s due process holding for the
plurality to the Eighth Amendment view expressed by Justices
Souter and Stevens.76 “The array of views expressed in Simmons
itself suggests that the rule announced there was, in light of this
Court’s precedent, ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds.’”77 Simmons was thus “an unlikely candidate for ‘old-rule’
status.”78 Still, neither Gardner nor Skipper dictated the result in
Simmons, because other Supreme Court decisions – California v.
Ramos and Caldwell – complicated the legal landscape relative to
the information that must be made available to the sentencing
jury.79 Reasonable judges at the time of O’Dell’s case “could have
drawn a distinction between information about a defendant and
information concerning the extant legal regime.”80
Based on the Court’s observation in O’Dell about the status of
Simmons, it is apparent that reliance on Furman for a Lackey claim
poses a similar problem for a habeas petitioner. Furman was a per
curiam opinion which stated only the conclusion, with no reasoning,
that the sentence of death in the relevant cases constituted Cruel
and Unusual Punishment.81 Beyond that, Furman included
separate opinions from each Justice that expressed a similarly wide
array of views about the precise legal problem created by the thenexisting capital punishment regimes at issue. Justice Stewart’s
opinion focused on the arbitrariness of the death penalty by likening
it to being struck by lightning.82 Justice Douglas alluded to the
arbitrariness of the death penalty with respect to race and

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

430 U.S. 349 (1977).
O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 165.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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poverty.83 Justice White said that “there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.”84 Justices Brennan and
Marshall would have found the death penalty unconstitutional in
all circumstances (the only two justices to hold that view). 85 It is
undoubtedly true, then, that arbitrariness and caprice were a
consistent theme of the Furman majority.86 To say, however, that a
majority of the Furman Court indisputably held that “a state may
not arbitrarily inflict the death penalty,” 87 and that this holding
necessarily means that lengthy stays on death row are
unconstitutionally arbitrary, is to overstate Furman’s reach. To
draw such a lesson from what is merely a connected theme of five
separate opinions is to describe Furman’s reach at a level of
generality that Teague simply does not countenance.
The better articulation of Furman is to say that a majority of
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids arbitrary
infliction of the death penalty through a system that gives the
sentencer unbridled discretion to impose death without meaningful
consideration of the particularized circumstances of the case. This,
in fact, is the way that the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia
describes Furman, and that opinion was written by two of the
Justices in the Furman majority – Justices Stewart and Stevens
(Justice Powell also wrote the joint opinion, but he was a dissenter
in Furman).88 Notice the difference in the level of generality. Had
the Court in O’Dell applied Teague at the level of abstraction that
Judge Carney employed in Jones, surely Teague would not have
barred O’Dell’s Simmons claim. It would have been enough to say
that as of 1988, the Court’s prior decisions had set forth a wellsettled general principle that a jury must be permitted to consider
evidence of the defendant’s character and background. That
statement, as such, would be accurate. In fact, it could even fall
within the kind of sweeping description of Eighth Amendment law
after Furman that we see in Judge Carney’s Jones opinion. But it
would not capture the more narrow, and more nuanced, claim that
Simmons and O’Dell were attempting to make.
Another example that undermines the Jones analysis is Saffle
v. Parks.89 There, the defendant Parks was convicted of first-degree
murder in Oklahoma, after shooting and killing a gas station
employee because Parks believed the employee would tell police
Id. at 242-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 324 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
86 See LINDA E. CARTER, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 29
(3rd ed. 2012) (discussing the different views).
87 Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1068.
88 Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976).
89 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
83
84
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that Parks had used a stolen credit card to buy gas. 90 During the
penalty phase of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that in
determining the appropriate punishment it had to “avoid any
influence of sympathy” for the defendant.91 Parks argued that this
was tantamount to telling the jury it could not make effective use of
his mitigating evidence, and thus violated the Eighth
Amendment.92 In response to the State’s invocation of Teague,
Parks argued that the Eighth Amendment rule he proposed was not
“new” because it was merely an extension of Eighth Amendment
principles established by Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v.
Oklahoma.93
Together those cases held that the Eighth
Amendment requires that a defendant be permitted to offer
mitigating evidence and that the State not forbid jurors from
considering it.94 These were two of the early cases giving effect to
the even more general Eighth Amendment principle, derived from
Court’s decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina95 and Roberts v.
Louisiana,96 that the Eighth Amendment requires the jury to give
individualized consideration to the facts and circumstances of the
defendant’s case in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
At the level of generality employed by Judge Carney in Jones,
Parks would have prevailed in avoiding the Teague bar. Yet he did
not. The Court held that although the Lockett-Eddings rule
prohibits the State from barring the consideration of mitigating
evidence, it does not impose a rule regarding how jurors consider
and weigh mitigation.97 Moreover, nothing about Oklahoma’s antisympathy instruction bars the jury from using mitigation to render
a reasoned moral response to the evidence; it simply forbids a purely
emotional response.98 Nor could Parks make use of the Court’s
decision in California v. Brown, which actually upheld another antisympathy instruction against an Eighth Amendment challenge on
direct appeal.99 Consequently, Parks was asking for a rule of law
that was not dictated by any Eighth Amendment precedent, and
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 488-89.
94 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 (1982) (stating “[j]ust
as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of
law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (stating “the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [sic] not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”).
95 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
96 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
97 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 490-91.
98 Id. at 493.
99 Id. at 493-94.
90
91
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was therefore new.100
The Court’s most recent decision on non-retroactivity makes
this point, as well, and would have been an important case for the
Jones opinion to consider despite the fact that it was not an Eighth
Amendment case. In Chaidez v. United States, the Court held that
its 2010 ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky was not retroactive to cases
on collateral review.101 Padilla applied the settled ineffective
assistance of counsel test from Strickland v. Washington and held
that an attorney performs in a constitutionally deficient manner if
he fails to provide accurate advice to a client about the immigration
consequences of a conviction arising from a guilty plea.102 Again,
viewed at a relatively high level of generality, one could have said
(as did Chaidez) that Padilla merely applied the general principle
of Strickland to a new set of facts.103 But, Justice Kagan’s opinion
for the Court found, Padilla “did something more.”104 Padilla also
concluded as a threshold matter that legal advice about deportation
consequences – which are typically viewed as collateral
consequences and not direct ones – was subject to the Strickland
ineffective assistance standard, a matter that prior decisions had
left unresolved.105 This special nuance in the claim thus made
Padilla’s rule new. Reasonable jurists could have (and did) disagree
about the ineffective assistance rule that Padilla adopted.106 That
more specific rule was not “dictated” by precedent.107
Based on this understanding of the Court’s “new rule” cases,
the Lackey claim proposes a new rule. Particularly in light of the
Court’s repeated rejection of the claim, a reasonable jurist would not
feel compelled by Furman or any other precedent to conclude that
the Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty upon
an inmate whose execution has not been carried out within a
particular (as yet unstated) time period. It is true that some
commentators have argued that the Eighth Amendment prevents
imposition of the sentence after inordinate delay. 108 But this,
combined with consistent judicial rejection of the claim, merely
reinforces the point that reasonable minds could differ as to
whether Furman and its progeny require the rule. As in Chaidez,
the fact that courts have uniformly rejected Lackey claims until
Id. at 489.
133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
102 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984),
held that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the inmate must prove
objectively deficient performance by the attorney and that counsel’s
performance prejudiced the inmate.
103 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1111.
104 Id. at 1108.
105 Id. at 1110.
106 Id. at 1111.
107 Id.
108 See supra note 2.
100
101
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Jones demonstrates why the rule is new: the right that Jones
recognized was not “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” 109 The
district court’s opinion in Jones wholly fails to consider any of these
relevant new rule cases, which are fatal to the court’s analysis.

III. WHETHER THE LACKEY CLAIM IS PROCEDURAL OR
SUBSTANTIVE
Having established that Lackey claims propose “new” rules,
the next inquiry is whether the claim falls under one of the two
exceptions to the general principle of non-retroactivity for new
rules.
The second exception is far easier to dispose of. The Court
has said that new rules can be applied on collateral review if they
are “watershed rules” of criminal procedure.110 The Court has also
said, however, that this exception is “extremely narrow” and has
consistently rejected every effort to characterize a new rule as a
watershed one.111
To qualify, the rule must create an
“‘impermissibly large risk’” of an inaccurate conviction, as well as
“‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”112 Here, the delay-inexecution claim (assuming it is a procedural one, which is the
subject of the following discussion) has nothing to do with the
accuracy of the conviction or the fairness of the trial mechanism.
Therefore, it is quite clearly not a watershed rule.113
Instead, the first Teague exception presents a far more
complicated problem for the government than determining whether
the rule is new.
It also requires capital litigators and reviewing courts to dig
somewhat deeper than the Ninth Circuit did in Smith v. Mahoney,
where it applied the Teague bar solely on the ground that the Lackey
claim proposed a new rule but did not ask whether the rule was
substantive or procedural.114 Judge Fletcher’s dissent, to its credit,
Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 527-28.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
111 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417-18 (2007) (listing cases in
which the claim was rejected).
112 Id. at 418 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004)).
113 See CJLF Brief, supra note 58, at 17 (arguing that Jones is not asking for
a watershed rule). For interesting commentary on application of the second
exception in other constitutional contexts, see Ezra Landes, A New Approach to
Overcoming the “Watershed Rule” Exception to Teague’s Collateral Review
Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that watershed rules can develop from
lines of cases taken together). See also Eric Schab, Departing From Teague:
Miller v. Alabama’s Invitation to the States to Experiment with New
Retroactivity Standards, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 213 (2014) (arguing for Miller
v. Alabama retroactivity based on the “watershed” rule exception, where the
case is taken together with other similar cases).
114 611 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2010).
109
110
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at least argued that Teague did not apply because it was
substantive, though her analysis was conclusory and did not fully
explore the matter.115 Her dissent merely repeated the language of
the first Teague exception.116 Still, Judge Fletcher seemed to be
targeting the right kind of argument and analysis. Whether her
legal conclusion was ultimately correct is a different matter. A few
other lower federal court judges have considered the question, but
their analyses also do not quite capture the nuance and depth of the
problem.117
The
Supreme
Court’s
procedural-versus-substantive
jurisprudence is less developed than its new rule cases. But the
Court has had occasion to apply the framework. Reiterating Justice
Harlan’s separate opinion in Mackey v. United States,118 the Court
has explained that applying the rule of non-retroactivity to
procedural, but not substantive, rules helps to ensure that the
criminal law’s interest in finality is properly protected.119 Rules are
substantive when they “prohibit a certain category of punishment
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 120 So if
the rule would categorically forbid punishment for a class of
offenders, it matters not what procedure the state follows – the
Constitution always disallows the punishment. 121 A new rule is also
considered substantive where it “alters the range of conduct or class
of persons that the law punishes.” 122 Finally, the Court has said
that a new rule is substantive when it “narrows the scope of a
criminal statute by interpreting its terms.”123 So if the rule would,
in light of the new interpretation of the statute, forbid imposition of
criminal punishment for the defendant’s act, then the defendant
ought to benefit from the new interpretation.
In most of the Court’s “new rule” cases, it was clear that the
rule was procedural rather than substantive. But the cases that
have grappled with the issue provide only limited guidance for a
Lackey claim. In Schriro v. Summerlin,124 the Court held that its
decision in Ring v. Arizona125 announced a new procedural rule.
Id. at 1005 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
Id.
117 See generally, e.g., Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1995); White,
79 F.3d 432; McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1479 (9 th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
118 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
119 See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
120 Id. at 329-30.
121 See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (discussing that the rule Parks wanted would
not “prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of
persons.”).
122 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
123 Id. at 351.
124 Id.
125 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
115
116
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Summerlin sexually assaulted his victim, crushed her skull, and
wrapped her body in a bedspread from his own home. 126
His
mother-in-law was his initial accuser and he later made
incriminating statements to his wife.127
After an Arizona jury
convicted Summerlin on charges of first-degree murder and sexual
assault, the trial court – pursuant to then-existing capital
sentencing procedure in Arizona – found two aggravating factors
and no mitigating factors, and sentenced Summerlin to death. 128
During his federal habeas proceedings, the Court decided Ring,
which held that the Sixth Amendment requires that aggravating
factors in a capital case be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.129 In finding Ring to have announced a procedural rule, the
Court emphasized that procedural rules “do not produce a class of
persons convicted of conduct that the law does not make criminal,
but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of
the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.”130
If a rule regulates “only the manner of determining the defendant’s
culpability,” it is procedural and not substantive. 131 Ring, according
to the Court, did not change the conduct for which Arizona could
seek the death penalty, nor did it entirely forbid the death
penalty.132 Rather, it simply determined how the fact-finder could
constitutionally determine whether the defendant’s conduct makes
him death-eligible.133
“Rules that allocate decisionmaking
authority in this way are prototypical procedural rules,” the Court
held.134
The mere fact that the rule implicates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is not enough
to make the rule substantive. In Graham v. Collins,135 a Texas
death row inmate claimed that he was entitled to federal habeas
relief because the Texas “special issues” – questions that the
sentencing jury must answer affirmatively in order to impose
capital punishment – were inadequate to allow the jury to give effect
to mitigating evidence of Graham’s youth and good character traits.
Graham relied upon Penry v. Lynaugh136 and other cases, which
found that the defendant’s mitigating evidence was beyond the
effective reach of the sentencer.137 But the Court found that
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Ring, 530 U.S. at 603.
Summerlin, at 352.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
506 U.S. 461 (1993).
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Graham, 506 U.S. at 465.
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Graham’s evidence was placed before the jury and the jury was not
forbidden from considering it as mitigating under the existing
special issues.138 At a minimum, reasonable jurists in 1984 could
have disagreed about whether the Eighth Amendment required a
new instruction for Graham’s mitigating evidence.139 So Graham
sought a new rule because neither Penry nor its predecessors
dictated the rule that Graham sought. 140 Moreover, the Court found
that the rule was procedural because it neither decriminalized a
class of conduct nor did it prohibit imposition of the death penalty
upon a class of persons. 141 The Court used similar language three
years earlier when it decided Saffle v. Parks, concluding that
Parks’s proposed new rule – that an anti-sympathy instruction
violated the Eighth Amendment because it effectively prohibited
the jury from giving effect to his mitigating evidence – was also
procedural. 142
The difficulty of drawing the substantive/procedural line,
particularly in Eighth Amendment cases, is apparent in the ongoing
litigation over the retroactivity of the Court’s holding in Miller v.
Alabama.143 There the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
forbids mandatory imposition of life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a homicide that the defendant committed before
reaching age eighteen.144 Rather, although the state may impose
such a sentence, it can only be done under a discretionary
sentencing regime where the trial court weighs a variety of factors
in arriving at the sentence.145
Whether the case applies
retroactively on collateral review has confounded the lower courts
and been the subject of scholarly commentary. 146 The Court
recently granted certiorari in a Miller retroactivity case,
Montgomery v. Louisiana,147 which will give the Court the
opportunity to resolve the dilemma over whether Miller announced
a substantive or procedural rule. The Court had previously granted
review of a case that later became moot, before granting certiorari

Id. at 475.
Id. at 477.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494.
143 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
144 Id. at 2469.
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(stating the question is “a close call”). For scholarly treatment of the issue, see
Schab, supra note 113, at 215 (arguing for Miller’s retroactivity); Brandon
Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (arguing that Miller was not about process but rather
substantive sentencing outcomes for juvenile offenders).
147 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015).
138
139
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in Montgomery.148
Those courts that have applied Miller retroactively have
described the holding as forbidding life without parole for juveniles
in the absence of individualized consideration – that is, forbidding
mandatory life without parole as a distinct sentence.149 Viewed this
way, the rule is substantive because it forbids the imposition of the
relevant punishment – life without parole – on a class of defendants
(the relevant class being those juveniles who have not received
individualized consideration). Some have also assumed that Miller
was retroactive because its companion case – Jackson v. Hobbs –
was brought on collateral review and the petitioner there received
the benefit of the Miller holding.150
Those courts that have found Miller not to be retroactive have
focused on the argument that Miller was based on reasoning more
akin to the individualized sentencing strand of cases in the Supreme
Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence. 151
The Michigan
Supreme Court, for example, recently held that Miller was not
retroactive under Teague because it did not bar a particular penalty
for a particular class of offenders or a type of crime (i.e., it left life
without parole intact as a punishment for juvenile homicide
defendants),152 it did not foreclose the punishment that the
defendants were serving (life without parole),153 and it did not rest
on statutory interpretation grounds, thus making the third type of
substantive rule inapplicable.154 The court also found it significant
that the Court’s language in Miller tended to employ the rhetoric of
non-retroactivity, noting that the Miller Court stated multiple times
that it was not announcing a “categorical bar” and that it was only
requiring “that a sentencer follow a certain process.” 155
Lackey claims, like Miller claims, sit at the intersection of the
148 See generally Toca v. Louisiana, 141 So. 3d 265 (La. 2014), cert granted,
135 S. Ct. 781 (2014), cert. dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015).
149 See Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2014); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d
487 (Wyo. 2014); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2013); State v. Ragland,
836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014).
150 See Mares, 335 P.3d at 508; Aiken, 765 S.E.2d at 576; Ragland, 836
N.W.2d at 116. This is a dubious conclusion, and others have explained why it
is problematic. See, e.g., People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 713 (Mich. 2014)
(explaining that the State did not raise non-retroactivity as a defense in
Jackson); Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the
Coming Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 29 n.32
(2012) (speculating that “perhaps the Court was oblivious to the retroactivity
issue” in Miller and Jackson, but concluding that “I, like others, assume the
Court intends to apply Miller retroactively.”).
151 See Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 716; Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.
2013); State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829 at 838 (La. 2013); Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 at 3 (Pa. 2013).
152 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 710.
153 Id. at 723.
154 Id. at 708.
155 Id. at 701.
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substantive/procedural divide. Neither seems to neatly fit into
either category.156
A sensible argument exists that the rule sought on a Lackey
claim is a substantive one that fits the first Teague exception.157
The claim, one might argue, relates to an entire system of imposing
capital punishment that results in arbitrary infliction of death. A
select few may be executed, most will not be, and everyone on death
row must live under a system in which the legal machinery of the
State operates so slowly and with such disregard as to the
importance of bringing the sentence to finality that the ultimate
fate of any given inmate is merely a product of happenstance rather
than reasoned judgment about achieving legitimate penological
goals. Death as a punishment cannot exist in such a system, the
argument runs, and also be consistent with the Eighth Amendment.
The State therefore is forbidden from imposing capital punishment
upon anyone so long as it maintains a system of imposing
punishment that functions with such extraordinary delays. To
demonstrate the appeal of this argument, consider the capital cases
that have imposed substantive rules that would apply retroactively
– for example, Atkins v. Virginia, which held that state cannot
impose the death penalty on those who are mentally disabled; 158
Roper v. Simmons, which said the state cannot impose the death
penalty upon a person who committed the offense before reaching
age eighteen;159 or Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that the state
cannot impose the death penalty for a non-homicide crime against
the person.160 In those cases, there is no procedure the state could
adopt that would make anyone in those categories death-eligible.
Similarly, one could argue, a Lackey claim involves a class of
persons who have already spent so much time awaiting execution
that their death sentence is now a product of an arbitrariness that
renders the sentence itself cruel and unusual, and there is now no
procedure that the state could follow or adopt to turn back the clock
as to that class of death row inmates. Consequently, because the
rule here would “prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on a
particular class of persons,”161 it is, the argument goes,
156 See Schab, supra note 113, at 214 (noting cases in which lower courts
have struggled to place Miller claims into either category). See e.g. State v.
Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (characterizing the claim as “more
substantive than procedural”).
157 See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1479 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (detailing the exception). See also Flynn, supra note 2, at 317-18
(arguing that under Teague, Lackey claims are substantive because an entire
class of prisoners are rendered ineligible for the death penalty); Root, supra note
2, at 333 (suggesting that Lackey claims could fall within first Teague
exception); Simmons, supra note 2, at 1264 (same).
158 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
159 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
160 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
161 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 485.
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quintessentially substantive. This is easily the most compelling
ground for finding that a delay-in-execution claim survives the
Teague bar.
But alluring as this argument for a substantive new rule
might be, it is less compelling once one considers how the ruling
would apply. To fall within the first Teague exception, the rule
would have to apply to all persons on death row who fall into the
same class as the inmate proposing the rule. But how, in the case
of a Lackey claim, could we possibly determine what the relevant
classification is?162 If the Jones court is saying that the systemic
delays in California render the entire system unconstitutional, then
the State could not impose the death penalty upon anyone. And
every inmate on death row could file a habeas petition alleging a
Lackey claim and be entitled to relief, even if that person had been
on death row for only a very short time. Surely that cannot be
correct. The essence of the Lackey claim, for it to be taken at all
seriously as an Eighth Amendment matter, is that it should be
reserved only for extraordinary delays not attributable to the
inmate. Some delay, after all, is both inevitable and desirable, so
as to allow for thorough judicial and executive review of a given
capital conviction and death sentence. Therefore, only those on
death row for extremely long periods could even qualify for relief.
But what, exactly, is the minimum length of time that would
implicate the Eighth Amendment? The Jones court is unclear on
this, as is virtually every other commentary that would permit relief
on such a claim.163 That is as it should be, for there seems to be no
way – textually, historically, structurally, or by reference to
precedent – to accurately determine the maximum time on death
row that the Eighth Amendment would tolerate.
So one reason why the claim might best be characterized as
procedural rather than substantive is because it does not ultimately
seek to identify a particular class of persons who cannot be
subjected to the death penalty because of their status or class.164 It
does not establish a categorical ban. Rather, the claim is actually
directed at the State, and in particular, the malfunction in its
processes for carrying a death sentence to finality in a timely way.
Some death row inmates will have had their executions delayed for
reasons that do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, such as their
own repeated attempts to litigate their claims on appellate and post162 See White, 79 F.3d at 438 (holding that the claim does not fit first Teague
exception because, inter alia, it does not place defendant in a class of offenders
for whom the death penalty could not apply).
163 But see Aarons, supra note 2, at 207 (arguing that a delay-in-execution
claim is ripe when the inmate has spent twice the national average of time on
death row, and tying this standard to the Court’s standard for determining
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial).
164 See CJLF Brief, supra note 41, at 16 (arguing that Jones does not fall into
a class or category of offenders for whom the law forbids capital punishment).
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conviction review. Others will face delay not because of abusive or
deliberately dilatory litigation tactics, but because courts have
taken long periods to issue rulings. Still others may have had their
executions delayed because of misconduct by the State, although
this would likely be far more rare. Yet surely, to the extent that
Eighth Amendment relief should even be available for a delay-inexecution claim (a dubious assertion), those in the latter category
would have a far greater claim to Eighth Amendment relief than
those in the former category, who arguably should have no claim to
relief whatsoever.165 The Lackey claim, if meritorious at all, would
therefore not apply to an entire class of persons. Rather, it would
apply only on a case-by-case basis to those few prisoners whose
executions have been delayed to intolerable extremes because the
State failed to follow procedures that would have ensured timely
execution.
This leads to the next reason why the claim should be
characterized as procedural and not substantive. That is, what
distinguishes the Lackey claim is that, at bottom, it requires a
process that the State must follow – its executive actors as well as
its courts – in order to ensure timely execution and avoid an Eighth
Amendment violation (assuming, again, such a violation exists). If
the State follows such a process, then the prisoner has no Eighth
Amendment claim for relief, even if his execution is substantially
delayed. The Jones court’s effort to characterize this as a systemic
problem in California that renders the entire system
unconstitutional is grossly overstated. Rather, what matters is
whether those systemic problems have resulted in inordinate delays
that are not meaningfully attributable to the prisoner. An inmate
who has been on death row for twenty-five years because of
inexcusable judicial delay or because of misconduct on the part of
the State simply does not have the same Eighth Amendment claim
as an inmate who has been on death row for twenty-five years and
has continually sought to stave off execution with multiple
successive petitions, challenges to the execution procedure, or other
litigation tactics. An inmate may well be legally entitled to pursue
some of those avenues of relief, but they will inevitably delay his or
her execution date to varying degrees. Consequently, it seems
disingenuous for that same inmate to then claim that the
Constitution simultaneously permits him or her to seek all means
for relief and that a delay caused by the inmate’s pursuit of relief
can be cruel and unusual.
In fact, notwithstanding some language suggesting that the
ruling was substantive, the Jones opinion – in multiple places,
including the statement of its holding – flatly contradicts any such
165 See Sharkey, supra note 2, at 894-96 (distinguishing between various
causes for delay, and concluding that an Eighth Amendment violation occurs
only where the delay is caused by state misconduct or negligence).
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conclusion.
First, Judge Carney’s reliance on Furman and the
arbitrariness standard suggests a procedural rule. Furman, after
all, was itself a process case.166 Only two of the five Justices in the
Furman majority (Brennan and Marshall) were willing to go as far
as to declare the death penalty cruel and unusual in all
circumstances. The other three Justices in the majority – Stewart,
White, and Douglas – did not. Rather, as the joint opinion in Gregg
explained, those three Furman concurrences focused “on the
procedures by which convicted defendants were selected for the
death penalty rather than on the actual punishment inflicted.”167
And Furman’s arbitrariness standard is the constitutional principle
that ushered in a new era of judicially-enforced “super” process for
capital cases. That is, it has since been invoked to ensure that a
state’s capital punishment regime offers the kind of procedural
protections necessary to avoid Furman-type arbitrariness – such as
guided jury discretion and individualized consideration of
aggravators and mitigators.168 Had the Jones court been applying
a categorical ban, it would most likely have used the two-prong
framework developed since Coker v. Georgia169 and applied in cases
166 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that the
issue before the Court is not whether the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional but, rather, whether it is unconstitutional as applied to
murder or rape where it is imposed infrequently); id. at 306-310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (finding it unnecessary to reach question of whether death penalty
is per se unconstitutional, and limiting consideration to constitutionality of
death penalty under a system in which it is “wantonly and freakishly
imposed.”). See also Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16 (2007) (“the arbitrariness that Furman denunciated was a procedural
problem.”).
167
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 (joint opinion). See also id. at 188 (stating that
“Furman held [the death penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.”).
168 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-200 (stating that, because Furman
requires that sentencing discretion be channeled and limited, Georgia’s new
statute was valid because it appropriately narrowed the class of death-eligible
offenders, directed the sentence to the circumstances of the offense, and
provided for automatic appeal); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 30204 (1976) (holding that North Carolina’s mandatory capital sentencing statute
fails to provide procedural safeguards to satisfy Furman’s concerns about
unbridled jury discretion and therefore requires individualized consideration of
each capital defendant’s case, character, and background); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
602-04 (holding that individualized sentencing, derived from Furman’s
concerns, requires fact-finder to consider evidence in mitigation).
For a fresh take on Furman and the doctrine that followed from its holding,
see Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11. For an excellent discussion of how Lockett
interpreted Furman and Woodson, see Scott Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991).
169 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977).
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like Atkins,170 Roper,171 and Kennedy.172 That framework first
evaluates the objective indicia of societal attitudes toward a
particular death penalty practice, seeking evidence of a consensus
in favor of or against that particular application of capital
punishment.173 Having ascertained the objective evidence (which,
it seems, is not enough to dispose of the case, regardless of what the
evidence shows), the court then employs a subjective analysis as to
whether the practice is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. 174
This categorical exemption framework applies to cases challenging
the death penalty for a particular crime (as in Coker, for rape of an
adult woman, and Kennedy, for aggravated rape of a child) or for a
particular class of capital defendant with reduced culpability (as in
Atkins, for the mentally disabled, and Roper, for those who commit
their crimes before age eighteen). 175 Yet there is not even a hint of
this framework in the Jones opinion. There is only reliance on the
process cases like Furman and its progeny. Indeed, if one were to
select an Eighth Amendment case establishing a guiding
framework for substantive, categorical bans on capital punishment,
Furman would be quite a poor choice. Coker and its progeny would
be far better.
Perhaps more starkly, the Jones court’s opinion stated that
“the Court holds that where the State permits the post-conviction
review process to become so inordinately and unnecessarily delayed
that only an arbitrarily selected few of those sentenced to death are
executed, the State’s process violates the Eight [sic] Amendment.”176
This language implicitly recognizes that all death row inmates are
not similarly situated as to the application of the principle that the
court set forth. The holding is not directed mainly at identifying a
protected class of inmates who are absolutely shielded from the
imposition of the death penalty, but rather is directed at the State,
insisting that capital punishment is permissible only when the
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005).
172 554 U.S. 407, 408 (2008).
173 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67.
174 Id. at 563.
175 One might also include in this category the imposition of the death
penalty for a non-triggerman accomplice to a criminal homicide. See generally
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Enmund, however, was subsequently
limited. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (finding that the death
penalty is not necessarily disproportionate for an accomplice who demonstrates
reckless disregard for human life). Therefore, because the Enmund-Tison rule
directs courts to consider the defendant’s culpable state of mind in determining
whether the death penalty is proportionate, those cases might also fall into this
second category of offenders, whose exemption from the death penalty is
predicated upon reduced culpability. For a fuller discussion of this and other
matters related to the consequences of the Court’s Eighth Amendment capital
proportionality framework, see J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of
Minos, 69 LOUISIANA L. REV. 593 (2009).
176 Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1067 (emphasis added).
170
171
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State follows certain procedures to ensure that the punishment is
brought to finality in a timely manner. Only those who are
subjected to an “inordinate and unnecessary” delay (whatever that
is), that is the fault of the State and not substantially attributable
to the inmate, would qualify for relief. But where the State has
implemented and followed a procedure that attempts to mitigate
extraordinary delays, the death sentence does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. So when the Jones court refers to the “system” that is
“unconstitutional,”177 it apparently is referring to the system as
applied to those inmates who have languished for extreme periods
of time not because of their mere efforts to obtain post-conviction
relief but because the State (and its courts) has not followed such a
procedure to ensure that post-conviction relief is adjudicated in a
timely manner. This kind of rule thus bears the hallmarks of a
procedural rule, and not a substantive one, pursuant to the Court’s
Teague jurisprudence.
Of course, the remedy for an Eighth Amendment delay-inexecution claim might tell us something about how to resolve the
substantive/procedural dilemma. The district court in Jones
purported to “vacate” Jones’s death sentence,178 but was otherwise
silent about the precise nature and scope of the remedy for the
constitutional violation that Jones supposedly suffered. What,
then, is the sentence that Jones would have to serve for his
conviction? Does the sentence default to life without parole? This
has been suggested by some as the appropriate remedy.179 And if it
is, it would go some distance toward establishing that the rule here
is substantive and not procedural. But if that is the remedy, then
it is a truly bizarre remedy. The claim here, after all, is that the
State has taken too long to carry out the prisoner’s execution, thus
forcing him to endure what is tantamount to life in prison. 180 The
prisoner is complaining about languishing in prison. And so the
Id. at 29.
Id. Scheidegger notes that Judge Carney’s vacatur was improper, and
that all Judge Carney could do was to issue a conditional writ until Jones is
resentenced. See Kent Scheidegger, Does A California District Attorney Have
Standing to Intervene in a Federal Habeas Corpus Case?, Crime and
Consequences
Blog,
available
at
www.crimeandconsequences.com
/crimblog/2014/07/does-a-california-district-att.html (posted July 28, 2014).
179 See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority’s opinion that a prisoner must
“affirmatively demonstrate” why he failed to file his petition sooner was the
“exact opposite of the requirements.”). See also Hedges, supra note 2, at 607
(arguing that commutation to life is the proper remedy); Sharkey, supra note 2,
at 895 (arguing for commutation to life, but only where the delay is caused by
state misconduct or negligence).
180 See Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1053 (“For all practical purposes, then, a
sentence of death in California is a sentence of life imprisonment with the
remote possibility of death – a sentence no rational legislature or jury could ever
impose.”).
177
178
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remedy is to give the prisoner . . . life in prison? How could that be
a remedy for a complaint that the state has allowed the prisoner to
languish in prison?
The better remedy would be to order
resentencing, which could include another capital sentence, which
would have to be carried out according to procedures that do not
cause inordinate delay. 181 That remedy, incidentally, would mean
functionally that the rule does not put Jones beyond the reach of
California’s capital murder or capital sentencing law, and is
therefore most likely procedural. The only way to avoid this result
is to say that Jones can never be resentenced to death, even under
a new procedural regime that mitigates extraordinary State-based
delays. Yet the Jones court is not clear about the consequences of
its ruling, which only complicates the present matter. But authority
exists for the proposition that imposition of the death penalty upon
resentencing, after an initial extended period on death row from the
original sentencing, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.182
So the call is admittedly a close one. The Lackey claim seems
to exist in some quasi-substantive/quasi-procedural jurisprudential
purgatory. But resolution of the matter may come down to this: if
the claim is that the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of a
death sentence upon any person who has been on death row for x
number of years, then the claim is substantive. If, however, the
claim is that the state’s post-conviction review processes have
resulted in the prolonged delay of a particular person’s execution in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, then the claim is procedural.
Though it hints at both, Jones appears to create the latter rule, not
the former. Still, in light of this Teague purgatory, the underlying
goals of habeas review could serve as a kind of tiebreaker. And they
militate in favor of finding that the rule is procedural.183 Again, the
181 See Aarons, supra note 2, at 210 (stating that even if the delay in
execution violates the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights, the prosecution
could still seek the death penalty in another proceeding).
182 See Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998) (where inmate initially
spent 15 years awaiting execution after conviction, then resentenced to death
after remand from federal habeas proceedings).
183 It has been argued that Teague should not apply at all to a Lackey claim
because the claim arises solely post-conviction and could not have been raised
on direct appeal. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463. See also Flynn, supra note 2,
at 316 (same). Other courts have disagreed with this, including the Ninth
Circuit in Smith v. Mahoney, and have applied Teague to Lackey claims. Smith
v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2010). But it is noteworthy that if this
argument has merit, then it raises the question of whether a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, rather than a habeas petition, is the better vehicle for a
Lackey claim. But see Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1068-69 (2009)
(statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (stating that habeas,
and not §1983, would be appropriate vehicle for consideration of Lackey claim).
If the claim can be raised on habeas, then it is subject to the Teague analysis.
Resolving this particular dispute is beyond the scope of this piece, which
assumes, as other courts have, that Lackey claims can be raised on habeas and
that they can be subjected to Teague analysis.
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Court has, for the better part of the last two to three decades,
consistently found that the habeas rules and doctrines should
further the interests of comity, finality, and federalism. 184 Those
interests also apparently motivated Congress in its creation of the
AEDPA.185 The Teague doctrine fits neatly within this
framework.186 Justice O’Connor’s Teague opinion noted the costs
that are imposed upon the States not simply by federal habeas
review but specifically by the retroactive application of new
constitutional rules.187 “In many ways,” she wrote, “the application
of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive
than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces
the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison
defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards.”188 The Court has subsequently offered
repeated variations on this same theme, connecting the rule of nonretroactivity to the broader purposes of habeas review and the
protection of state interests there.189
As explained here, though the procedural/substantive question
is a close one, the “new rule” question is not. In such a situation,
the burdens that habeas review and relief would impose upon the
States strongly suggest that the Lackey claim should be deemed
procedural. After all, if the Lackey claim was subject to AEDPA
deference under section 2254(d), it would (and should) likely fail. 190
Consequently, finding that the rule is not only new but also
procedural, and therefore Teague-barred, would be consistent with
and best serve the interests that the Congress and the modern
Court have repeatedly emphasized in limiting the scope of federal
habeas relief. Perhaps as a way of incentivizing greater alacrity in
processing and reviewing capital litigation, the death penalty states
would be free to create an avenue of relief for a delay-in-execution
See Broughton, supra note 33, at 135-54.
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 15,062 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at
15,035 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 15.037 (statement of Sen. Nickels).
186 Broughton, supra note 33, at 146-47.
187 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990) (stating that habeas
must “ensure that state convictions comply with the federal law in existence at
the time the conviction became final” but does not “provide a mechanism for
continued reexamination of final judgments based upon emerging legal
doctrine.”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (stating that Teague
“was motivated by a respect for a State’s strong interest in” finality). See also
Higginbotham, supra note 29, at 2452 (describing Teague favorably as being
consistent with “the purposes of habeas and the role of lower federal courts in
our constitutional scheme”).
190 See Harrington v, Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2001) (stating that to satisfy
§2254(d), the habeas petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the
claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement”) (emphasis added).
184
185
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claim.191 Absent that, however, and absent greater certainty on the
Lackey claim as a substantive one, there is little good reason to
penalize the government when its courts have shown fidelity to
prevailing constitutional norms with respect to the timing of capital
litigation and executions.

IV. CONCLUSION
Any state facing an Eighth Amendment challenge on federal
habeas review to a death sentence based on inordinate delay has a
range of sound arguments that should be sufficient to result in the
denial of relief. But before proceeding to the merits, the state and
the reviewing court should first carefully consider the application of
Teague’s nonretroactivity rule to such a claim. The weight of
authority strongly suggests that Teague bars relief. Yet for all of
the problems – the Teague analysis included – in the Jones v.
Chappell opinion, the decision at least has had the virtue of
prompting a serious conversation about capital punishment reform
in California and many other death penalty states where actual
execution is a distant and increasingly unlikely event.
Policymakers in active death penalty jurisdictions should give
serious thought to statutory changes that would – without
compromising a death row inmate’s ability to fairly and lawfully
contest the validity of his conviction and death sentence – ensure
more expeditious consideration of capital cases, as well as prompt
resolution of claims. The same should apply to federal courts, which
sometimes also unnecessarily contribute to delays in moving toward
execution. Even where resolution is timely, however, government
authorities responsible for carrying out executions should, once all
legal impediments to execution have been removed, do just that.
Though it selected the wrong form for doing so, Jones implicitly
sends a message worth heeding: if the government is to have a death
penalty at all, its actors must accept the realities that come with
enforcing it. That means actually executing killers who no longer
have a claim to judicial relief or to mercy.

191 See Sharkey, supra note 2, at 892 (advocating model legislation to
address delay-in-execution claims).

